REFRAMING DISASTER POLICY: THE GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES

 

L. Comfort, B.Wisner, S. Cutter, R. Pulwarty, K. Hewitt, A. Oliver-Smith,

J. Weiner, M. Fordham, W. Peacock, F. Krimgold

 

The Social Construction of Disaster

Disaster is widely perceived as an event beyond human control.  The capricious hand of fate has moved against unsuspecting human communities, creating massive destruction and despair.^[i] The sudden randomness of the event accentuates the cruelty of its effects, as surely the victims would have acted differently, had they known the risk. Other nations and organizations rush humanitarian aid to rebuild damaged communities, but stop short of examining the policies  and practices that contributed to the event.

 

Such characterization of disaster leads to actions that, instead of ameliorating root conditions of disaster, perpetuate and worsen them over time (Hewitt 1997; Blaikie, Cannon, Davis and Wisner  1994; Mileti1999).  As deaths and property losses increase globally, the perception of disaster influences substantively societal response to these damaging events.  We challenge this common perception of disaster, and argue that the policy of disaster response needs to include examination of the conditions that created vulnerability of human communities to unforeseen natural and technological events.

 

Disasters have become a policy problem of global scope that involves the ways in which modern developments magnify the vulnerability of human communities to natural and technological hazards. There has been a widespread failure to recognize and address the ways in which changes in land use, settlement policies, population distributions and the attendant degrading of habitats dramatically increase hazard exposure and vulnerability. These changes are often initiated under the legal framework of development policy, but in practice reduce the capacity of those at risk to respond effectively to such hazards. We propose that public vulnerability to disaster – those circumstances that place people at risk while reducing their means of response or denying them available protection – is an integral concern in policy development and evaluation. This proposition acknowledges the complex interaction among human communities and their built and natural  environments and compels change in the prevailing policy response of sending assistance only after the tragedy has occurred.

 

We further propose four basic premises to characterize the global problem of disaster. These are:

1. The increasing number and costs of disasters demonstrate a rate of social and environmental change that exceeds organizational capacity to manage it effectively.

2. Inability to manage social and environmental change is reinforced by an inadequate understanding of the components and consequences of that change, and its impact upon affected communities over time.

3. Uninformed interaction among individuals, organizations, and governments creates a cumulative pattern of interdependent practices that may, and often does, lead to massive failure in environmental, technical and organizational systems under stress.

 

4. Disasters serve as evidence of the need for change in public policy and practice, and create          an opportunity to redesign, revise or rebuild the human environment damaged by the event.

 

Without substantive redesign of policy and practice, the vulnerability of the built and natural  environments in risk-prone regions becomes cumulative with recurring damage from natural and technological hazards.             

 

Given this set of premises, the responsibility for initiating change in the pattern of policies and practice that leads to disaster also shifts to a wider range of participating actors. In this brief analysis, we offer a  perspective that acknowledges the increasing vulnerability of  human communities to explain the evolution of disaster in global context. We  illustrate this dynamic process of interacting conditions and cumulative practice with reference to the current case of Hurricane Mitch and its effects upon Honduras and Nicaragua. We further show that an analysis of the conditions precipitating disaster which includes information from multiple disciplines and levels of responsibility for action leads to a substantively different interpretation of the event. Proposed strategies for action following from this vulnerability perspective are substantively different from traditional perception and prevailing practice.

 

Disaster as a Outcome of Existing Practice

The events that led to the devastation in Honduras and Nicaragua in the wake of Hurricane Mitch began long before the errant storm stalled off the Atlantic coast of Honduras for five days beginning on October 28, 1998. In those fateful days, the Category 5 winds diminished, but the torrential rainfall (25 inches in one day) caused new problems. As the storm moved across Honduras to the mountainous region of Western Nicaragua, it continued to dump heavy rains in the region, causing flooding, starting mudslides, washing out roads, bridges, communications, water and power distribution lines, and whole villages. This is not the first time that Central America has been severely affected by a hurricane or flooding. Hurricanes Irene (1971), Fifi (1974), Joan (1988 ) and Cesar (1996) have caused recurring damage to the region.  In 1975, the lowlands of Choloma, Honduras suffered a landslide caused by a flooding river, killing 2,500 people (Blaikie et al. 1994:149).^[ii]  This same area suffered severely in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. Little had changed  in twenty-three years to make the area safer for residents of that vulnerable community, indicating that little had been learned from prior events (Pulwarty and Riebsame, 1997).

 

The impact of the heavy rains from Hurricane Mitch was exacerbated by the previous pattern of clearing the original forest of Nicaragua and Honduras. Many of the coffee plantations neatly terraced into the mountainsides of Nicaragua and the banana plantations carved out of the lush, coastal regions of Honduras were financed by multinational companies. The creation of large plantations, initiated in the belief that they were beneficial to the economic development of the country, had the secondary effect of displacing small farmers further into the mountains, where they in turn cut down forest to grow subsistence crops (Nations and Leonard 1986; Williams 1986; Nations 1992; Faber 1993; Stonich 1993).  This combination of  land-clearing practices has resulted in  the loss of approximately 53% of Nicaragua’s forested land since 1950.^[iii] The environmental consequences are sobering. Deforestation has contributed to the loss of nearly 3 million tons of topsoil through erosion, and led to the drying up of over 200 rivers.^[iv] Without tree roots to hold the topsoil in place, the heavy rains following Hurricane Mitch caused the unstable hillsides to slide, destroying crops, infrastructure, villages, and anything in the way. The long-term environmental consequences of clear-cutting land for agricultural purposes were never anticipated. The potential economic losses were never calculated, nor were mitigating actions taken to reduce the harmful effects of erosion upon existing lands. Secondary and tertiary effects in terms of lost agricultural production and employment upon human communities were not considered. Scientific data regarding the soil structure,  root structure of the forests, and meteorological patterns of the region were not integrated into policy decisions concerning economic development.

 

                                                                                     Figure 1

 

 

 

  

                     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                                                               

 

 

Source: U.S. Geological Survey, Center for Integration of Natural Disaster Information, 1998.

 

In further demonstration of the complex set of conditions that reduced the capacity of local and national governments in Honduras and Nicaragua to respond effectively to the damage wreaked by Hurricane Mitch, the national governments had seriously cut back expenditures for health services, transportation, and other public services. The effects of the cutbacks, combined with a severe drop in economic production, have led to a steady decline in the welfare of the population. Recent figures cited for Nicaragua present a sobering litany of poverty for this nation of 4.5 million people. As stated  by Sr. Porfirio Gamez, Movimento Communal Nicaraguense, 3.6 million are in poverty; 2.6 million experience hunger; 1.1 million have no access to health care; 1.5 million youth have no access to education; 2.0 million have no access to safe drinking water; 2.3 million have no access to electricity; and 4.0 million have no telephone.^[v]

The cutbacks in government expenditures were instituted in order to meet the austerity requirements specified by the Structural Adjustment Programs imposed by the international banks as a condition of extending international loans. These requirements created a severe conflict for the small economies of Central America.  They need the international loans to build their economies, but the conditions imposed by the loans weakened their capacity to meet sudden, unexpected disaster. The consequences of Hurricane Mitch proved far more devastating than expected, because of the weakened condition of the municipal and national governments.   

 

Reframing Disaster as an Evolving Policy Process

If disaster is understood as the product of a cumulative set of decisions over time, then the processes by which these choices are made become a focal point for potential change. Interacting decisions may either create increased vulnerability among the social, economic, political, environmental, organizational or technical conditions of the region, or reduce vulnerability to potential hazards. These decision processes operate on different levels of organizational function and in different societal arenas simultaneously, affecting one another reciprocally and adding to the complexity of the operating system. The crucial characteristic about disaster is that it is never final.

 

Decisions taken in response to a specific disaster become defining elements for the (temporary) resolution of that crisis, but also likely steps toward the creation of the next crisis. Disaster moves a community, a region, a governmental system from temporary state to temporary state. Reconstruction efforts intended to restore the community only to its previous level before the disaster often perpetuate the conditions that create vulnerability to disaster.  Little is done to prevent the recurrence of destructive consequences. Rather, these actions recreate the conditions for the next disaster.

 

Returning to the case of Hurricane Mitch in Central America, all seven of the republics in the region were affected in varying degrees by the severe storm. Each of the republics had some degree of awareness regarding their vulnerability to natural hazards, but none had an adequate assessment of the interrelatedness of the ecological conditions. In substantive ways, severe economic losses in Honduras and Nicaragua also affect the small economies of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Guatemala and Belize. For each nation, losses suffered in past disasters had imposed an added financial burden of reconstruction and recovery, consuming scarce resources and diverting attention and energy from tasks of economic development. In late October, 1998, the Central American nations were still reeling from the damaging effects of El Nino-related drought in 1997-1998, and the forest fires earlier in 1998. These events further exacerbated the problems of erosion and loss of forest, making the region more vulnerable to the torrential rains brought by Hurricane Mitch (Green, C., Tunstall, S. and Fordham, M. 1991). For example, reports of damage caused by flooding following Hurricane Fifi in 1974 were largely water-related. In cleaning up the damage after Hurricane Mitch in 1998, however, the residents faced clearing away tons of mud. The deforestation and erosion processes that had occurred in Honduras during the intervening twenty-four years had greatly increased the sedimentation levels. Cleaning up the mud that had flowed into homes, streets, sewer and water systems after Hurricane Mitch became a backbreaking, expensive, and virtually nationwide task.

 

The cumulative effect of preceding disasters, including the earthquakes of 1972 in Nicaragua, 1976 in Guatemala, 1986 in El Salvador, 1991 in Costa Rica and Panama, had consumed scarce resources in meeting immediate needs, leaving few remaining resources for mitigation and reduction of risk. These events were viewed as interruptions of the normal development process, and expenses associated with them were intended simply to recover the previous status. Each nation had struggled to cope with disaster in its own way, relying on assistance from the international community. Such assistance, however,  was directed toward immediate needs and did little to address the underlying problems of vulnerability in the region. The lack of any consistent policy for mitigation of risk in an area that is vulnerable to recurring hurricanes and earthquakes represents  faulty development  policy.

 

There is evidence that this pattern may be changing.  The presidents of the seven Central American nations met in Comalapa, El Salvador on 9 November 1998. At their meeting, they agreed that “it is necessary to construct mechanisms of prevention and mitigation of natural disasters with full participation of the communities.”^[vi] By including disaster mitigation in their collective Plan for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Central America, the presidents of the seven nations have taken a major step toward reframing disaster policy as a continuing process in the development of their respective nations and, collectively, the region. This is an important recognition of their common vulnerability and need for the design of a process for coordinated action to reduce hazards. Yet,

serious challenges remain. For example, watershed management is a common problem that requires coordinated action among all seven nations. Further, 90% of Central American commerce depends upon landline communications and transportation networks which were severely disrupted by the mudslides triggered by the storm. Roads and bridges, totally destroyed, left farmers with no means to get crops to markets, or producers in one nation to ship goods to other nations. Isolated, both producers and consumers suffer, as prices for basic goods spiral to triple their usual cost. The regional electrification network, seriously damaged, left sections of several countries without power. The need to repair the basic infrastructure of the region is urgent for not just one, but for all seven nations.

 

Engaging national and international participants, including public, private and nonprofit sectors, in the collective effort to reduce hazards is central to this approach.  Specifically, this task includes identifying participating organizations, establishing mechanisms of communication and information exchange among them, developing a set of common standards for assessing performance on the shared goal of risk reduction, and scheduling regular periods for review of existing conditions, feedback to all participants, and revision of action strategies across the region. Research has shown that specific social and demographic groups are more vulnerable to loss, or face greater difficulties during recovery from disaster. Representatives of, or advocates for, such groups as women, ethnic minorities, the disabled, the very old and the very young need to be included in the design and implementation of recovery, prevention and mitigation activities (Fordham 1998; Oliver-Smith 1991; Bolin 1986; Bolin and Stanford 1998; Peacock, Morrow and Gladwin 1997; Cutter 1995; Enarson and Morrow 1998).

 

The process of reframing disaster policy must occur within and among the Central American nations, leading to regional vulnerability reduction and sustainable development (Maskrey et al. 1998; Maskey and Peacock 1997).  By specifying a set of actions that engage participating organizations in the regular review of the risk factors in their interdependent environments, responsible organizations can foster a process of continuing learning and reverse the destructive spiral that has led to an increasingly fragile and threatened environment.

 

Organizational Constraints on Processes of Disaster Reduction

When the complexity of interacting scientific, social, political, and economic conditions exceeds the existing capacity for organizational control, decisions taken by local actors govern the direction of the evolving process. Yet, an integrated process of hazard reduction requires coordinated action across jurisdictional and disciplinary boundaries. Disaster reduction implies identifying and monitoring the critical points of decision across organizations and jurisdictions that avert, or lead to, disaster.  Such decisions often represent years of accepted social practice and constraining premises that expose different groups within the society to different levels of risk. This process of discovery is interactive.  As one group changes its practices, others adapt their behavior accordingly in ways that may achieve short-term economic benefit, but long-term environmental degradation.  The challenge is to guide this process of discovering effective means of reducing hazards that are perpetuated by complex, dependent relationships among multiple groups and organizations in constructive ways.

 

In devastated Honduras and Nicaragua, actions at the local level have already initiated a collective response to the disaster. Without waiting for assistance from the government or other organizations, ordinary citizens have picked up shovels, cleared homes and streets of mud and dirt, and set up shelters for the homeless.^[vii]  In doing so, they exhibited characteristics of self organization, that vital process of reallocating energy and action to meet current demands from the environment (Kauffman 1993; Comfort 1997).  In the shattered environment of disaster, rebuilding life at the community level is the basic need. Local residents also represent a valuable resource in the difficult, arduous tasks of recovery and reconstruction. Enabling these residents to take informed action to rebuild their lives is a vital policy alternative, one that is essential after the disaster (Maskrey 1989). Engaging these same residents in risk reduction practices as part of their ordinary household and community management is equally important (Eade 1998; Anderson and Woodrow 1999).  Investment in risk reduction is likely to be most efficient and effective when directed toward improving local capacity to act in coordinated ways to achieve this community-wide goal. The link between policy and practice in disaster mitigation needs to be established at the local level.

 

The Relentless Indifference of Vulnerability

While the consequences of Hurricane Mitch vividly illustrate the vulnerability of the small nations of Honduras and Nicaragua, characterized by low rates of GDP and high rates of unemployment, the

vulnerability of human populations to natural and technological hazards is not confined to developing nations. The problem may be even more costly in advanced industrial communities, which are characterized by interdependent systems of communications, transportation, water, gas, electrical power, sewage distribution and major investments in buildings and physical infrastructure. For example, in the 1995 Hanshin, Japan Earthquake, the cost in lives, over 6,000, and property losses, over $200 billion, far outstripped the losses incurred from Hurricane Mitch.  Further, damage to the Port of Kobe, sixth largest in the world, had economic repercussions for not only Japan, but for other Asian economies dependent upon Japanese products and trade (Comfort 1999).  The secondary and tertiary consequences of the  Hanshin Earthquake on the world economy can only be estimated, but the extraordinary cost of this disaster demonstrates the same characteristic of vulnerability for a human community, exposed to recurring seismic risk, that is apparent in developing nations.  The January 1998 Ice Storm, centered in Quebec, incurred $1.5 billion in costs, largely due to the destruction of a vulnerable electricity grid and transport system (Statistics Canada, 1998). Similarly, the Northridge Earthquake and Hurricane Andrew reflected growing vulnerabilities in the United States (Bolin and Stanford 1998; Peacock et al. 1997). The problems are global in scope. Without concerted international efforts, vulnerabilities and losses will substantially and dramatically increase.

 

Recommendations for Action

Returning to the definition of disaster as an evolving policy process that can be arrested and redirected, what policies and practices would change this perspective to support the long term goal of disaster reduction?  Five basic recommendations would contribute to this goal. They are:

 

1. Develop an interdisciplinary `vulnerability index’ that would provide a reliable measure of vulnerability in communities exposed to a range of hazards. Appropriate uses of information technology, through remote sensing and regional geographic information systems now make it possible to develop accurate, timely measures of environmental degradation or renewal in relation to social, economic, political or technical changes in the region. Relevant disciplines include: sociology, anthropology, geography, architecture, meteorology, engineering, law, administration and public policy. Such a coordinated effort to improve the assessment of risk in a geographic, place-based approach to vulnerable regions is now both technically and economically feasible (National Academy of Public Administration 1998, Maskrey et al. 1998).

 

2. Increase the capacity of communities to engage in coordinated action to reduce risk  by making timely, accurate, information about risk widely available through multi-way information exchange and feedback. Such processes lead to `self organization.’  The set of six community demonstration projects recently designated by the National Spatial Data Infrastructure Program under the US Department of Interior (Federal Geographic Data Committee Newsletter, 1998:1-2) is an example of building capacity among a set of organizations responsible for maintaining the environment in definable local regions.

 

 3. Transform vulnerability  in risk-prone regions into responsible action to avert disaster by initiating informed action at the local level. Local initiatives and participation may be facilitated by training, capacity building, and resource transfers. Such local level change may require outside support, and can be sustained through a network of organizations engaged in economic, social, political and scientific action and interorganizational learning (Wisner, B., O'Keefe, P., Westgate, K. 1977).

 

                4. Map the decision processes for disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and              recovery, identifying the critical actors at each jurisdictional level, the assumptions of each actor regarding risk, the different types of information each actor requires for informed policy making, and the design of an information infrastructure that will support such broad, multi‑way exchange of information, resources, incentives, and action.  Only by recognizing the complexity of the evolving process of managing the environment to sustain human communities will it be possible to transform the destructive spiral of disaster into a learning process for responsible management of the environment (Comfort 1993).

 

5. Reduce disaster globally through informed, responsible, systematic action to improve local conditions in vulnerable regions, enabling the population to manage their own environments more responsibly and equitably for the long-term perspective. The initial vision outlined for a Global Disaster Information Network represents a beginning step in this direction (GDIN Task Force 1997).

 

Hurricane Mitch illustrates the concept of socially‑constructed disasters. Risk reduction and hazard mitigation strategies must address the underlying practices contributing to vulnerability. If they do not, our current response and reconstruction policies are likely to lead to repeated disasters.

 

Notes